Dualisms, Cartesian and not
Locke dissented, wondering why the same thing could not be both a mind and a body.
Event dualism 1: There are mental events and physical events but no event is both.
Event dualism 2: All events are physical events but some are also mental events
The unity of apperception (UA)
Multiple mental events may happen to the same mind, subject, or Ego.
In that case they are all thoughts, desires, sensations, or whatever of the same mind, subject, or Ego; it is the same "I" that "thinks" them all.
This rejects the "bundle theory" of mind that originated with Hume and is popular with some contemporary philosophers of mind.
This rejects the "bundle theory" of mind that originated with Hume and is popular with some contemporary philosophers of mind.
Event identity (EI)
If event A = event B they happen to, involve, or relate all the same subjects, objects, or entities.
This seems an uncontroversial extension of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals,
C From EI: No physical event in anyone's brain can be the same event as any mental event occurring in his - or anyone's - mind.
This seems an uncontroversial extension of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals,
C From EI: No physical event in anyone's brain can be the same event as any mental event occurring in his - or anyone's - mind.
Event dualism 2 is not true.
[Update 12292015. C now seems to me not at all plausible.
Event dualism 2 seems a real and even attractive possibility.]
[Update 12292015. C now seems to me not at all plausible.
Event dualism 2 seems a real and even attractive possibility.]
Event dualism 1 does not exclude substance dualism.
But neither does it entail it.
The brain could be the Ego.
Dualism (Stanford) lucidly covers a lot of ground.
PS.
Identity criteria for events vary.
For example, Events.
But neither does it entail it.
The brain could be the Ego.
Dualism (Stanford) lucidly covers a lot of ground.
PS.
Identity criteria for events vary.
For example, Events.
No comments:
Post a Comment