Some points about Mackie's moral skepticism and my own

Mackie holds the following in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.

His own moral skepticism is the claim that there are no objective values.

An account of values should treat all alike, moral, non-moral, aesthetic, and any others

The thesis at issue is ontological; theses about meaning follow to suit.

Moral skepticism is a 2nd order view.

First order moral skepticism is either the view that “all morality is tripe” or that conventional morality is deeply immoral.

Moral claims like “rape is wrong” entail assertions about properties like “rape has the property of wrongness (the property something has just in case it is wrong).”

(A nominalist would not accept that, but never mind.)

Assuming Russellism about descriptions, that no such property exists, and modus tollens, moral claims turn out to be false.

Mackie offers a detailed characterization of what, as he thinks, moral properties would have to be like in order for moral truths to have the practical significance they are generally thought to have.

He argues that no such properties exist or could exist (he evidently thinks the first does not entail the second).

It seems to be his view that if properties of that description did exist they would be what moral terms in moral use denote.

I hold the following in various posts on this blog.

My moral skepticism is the claim that moral terms in moral use fail to denote, though they purportedly denote.

My account does not treat all value judgments alike, handling moral claims one way (“taboo theory”) and judgments of non-moral value another (subjective naturalism).

My theses are semantic; ontological issues such as his are interestingly related but not primary

Moral skepticism (whether his or mine) is a 2nd order view.

First order moral skepticism is the belief that moral assertions, common ones if not all, are all false.

The belief that moral claims like “rape is wrong” entail explicit property ascriptions like “rape has the property that something has just in case it is wrong” is part of the moral delusion (though not for nominalists, I suppose).

Both quoted expressions contain a moral term – “wrong” – in moral use and so are meaningless and hence neither true nor false.

Mackie’s position seems incoherent.

Consider that if there is no such property as wrongness then either “wrong” denotes something else or it fails to denote.

Mackie would agree the former is out of the question, and the latter entails that moral claims are meaningless, not false.

Most people who concern themselves with such things seem to think that properties are necessary.

The characterization he offers is fairly broad and drawn from common beliefs about the practical import of moral truths.

Mackie gives no argument why there could not be many such properties, even well-known and readily discernible to us, while moral terms in moral use nevertheless fail to denote.