Value, virtue, and morals

The belief is common that the analysis of human valuation must be all of a piece.

By “beautiful” one supposes is meant something like “good to look upon.”

By “good” in expressions like “good to look upon,” “good car,” and “good hammer” one supposes must be meant something very like what is meant in “good man.”

And by “good man” one thinks must be meant something much the same as “virtuous man,” “right-doing man,” or “a man who does no wrong.”

So if we think it is an error that “wrong” in uses such as we see in “a man who does no wrong” denotes and so it is also an error that “man who does no wrong” is a meaningful description, we must think much the same of such uses of “good” as cited above.

But I think this is not true and that valuation in non-moral cases is not to be understood through any variant of a Mackie-like error theory.

[J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong]

Instead, I think something closer to subjective naturalism is right.

Although not everything thought good is thought to be good for something, when someone describes something as good he generally means, broadly, that it is suitable, it being defeasibly understood when appropriate that he has in mind the sorts of uses, purposes, or ends for which such a thing is ordinarily wanted and that form a context with reference to which such things are normally evaluated.

Hence, given a degree of commonality of purpose and of understanding of one another, one man’s valuations can serve as a guide, certainly better than none even if only rough, for another’s choice.

And hence the much greater diversity of judgments when there is no context, or no obvious and clear context, of use or purpose with reference to which the goodness of the thing is evaluated, when the person making the judgment is inexperienced or lacking in relevant knowledge, or when there is nothing much to goodness but whether one likes the thing.

Whether something is good or suits  – me, you, most people, or whomever – is a matter of fact as much as any other.

And we can be as ignorant or mistaken about what does or will suit us as anyone trying to decide what to buy us for Christmas.

We can be wrong, for example, about which of an array of hammers we would find best to work with for days at a time as we put up a deck.

And one that suits at a given period in life may not work out for the long haul.

Continuing the example, arthritis or an illness leaving me weaker after recovery may mean the hammer I am used to is now too heavy and I need to switch to a lighter one.

Our judgments about what would be suitable for others can also be liable to error.

Is the hammer too heavy for a child so small?

Is the doll too scary looking for your cousin’s little girl?

Is the toy drum too noisy for your cousin to tolerate the child banging on it?

In any case there can be and usually are a variety of factors at work that bear on suitability.

And often, as to them, one can do little better than shrug and hope for the best.

But in every case one of the factors – in fact the ultimate and only deciding factor, whether the thing is wanted for something or not – is simply whether it is wanted or, in the relevant sort of case, preferred.

And it is this connection with desire, with preference, with human conation that makes goodness – or badness, for that matter, understood in a manner that fits what I have said about goodness – , though a matter of fact, a matter of subjective rather than objective fact.

Looking at the matter from another angle, putting it another way, we do not value anything because it is good; it is good because we value it.

I value my car and am glad I bought it because it is so reliable, gets great mileage, always starts on the first try even in the worst of winter, is quiet and easy to drive, and is good looking and comfortable to ride in.

I do not value it because it is thought to have some swell, special, and important property purportedly but  not denoted by "good."

And my valuing it certainly does not mean or entail either that I think it has some such property or that any sentence alleging it does have such a property is true.

To the contrary, "it is good," to put it in a nutshell, said of a car, or a smart phone, or an air conditioning system, just means we value it.

Now, to understand “good” and “bad” when used to judge people it seems to me that, in the rare situation in which for whatever reason we feel called upon to say whether someone is a good man, a good woman, or a good person, the judgment may either approach or even ultimately be a moral one.

Our understanding of such a judgment will be different depending on which of the two cases we are in; in the former case we have a judgment expressing a non-moral evaluation, as discussed above; but not, it is true, in the latter.

It will be convenient to illustrate the former case with parents who think theirs is “a good kid.”

That, of course, is a kid who does not much get into trouble and minds his parents and other adult authorities fairly well.

He does not abuse his siblings.

He does not start fights with other kids at school.

He doesn’t rob the other kids or steal their toys or other belongings.

And so on.

Note we can relevantly describe such kids without reference to supposed moral standards, to anyone’s moral beliefs, and in particular without reference to their moral beliefs, if any.

And we can do it without ourselves making any moral claims.

All the same, those traits – not abusing others, not stealing, not getting into trouble, and minding adults – do take us in the direction of moral territory since, as we know, people’s moral beliefs are apt to include condemnations of aggression, stealing, defiance and the like.

And they are apt to include commendation of non-violence, respect for the property of others, and a measure of willing obedience to authority.

In such and the like cases where the traits that form the basis of assessment are themselves extraneously or coincidentally objects of well-known moral views, judgments that someone is good or bad approach being moral judgments.

But they aren’t that, all the same.

On the other hand, if we hear someone referred to as “a good man” we know that what is at stake is generally not so simple, though it might be, and the temptation to understand this case on the model of the former is what accounts for moral theories like Hume’s theory of virtue and vice.

Hume thinks various traits disposing one to conduct endorsed by common moral belief are and are to be accounted virtues simply as traits that can be identified without making reference to moral beliefs or using moral terms, that we are apt to prize in certain contexts of judgment.

But Hume’s theory does not work for all the supposed virtues of his time or all traits disposing to conduct endorsed by popular moral opinion of his time or ours.

For example, it runs afoul, as he knows, of what he calls “monkish virtues,” traits commonly accounted virtues in his age – the Scottish Enlightenment, though very Christian for all that – that don’t suit his theory.

Ultimately, that is because people's moral opinions are by no means unfailingly such as to endorse or condemn traits, actions, or kinds of actions one might plausibly prize or deplore on such non-moral grounds as those of utility envisioned by Hume and so many other British moralists.

To return to the question of what it means to be a "good person," people in fact understand “virtue” to mean “a settled disposition to do what is right” and “vice” “a settled disposition to do what is wrong.”

Indeed, some would go further.

Some understand “virtue” to mean “a settled disposition to do what is right because it is right” and “vice” “a settled disposition to do what is wrong despite knowledge that it is wrong.”

And that being so, we have to understand that, sensu strictu, "virtue" has no meaning.

And that neither do judgments ascribing particular virtues, each defined in a manner suitable to this understanding of "virtue," or of virtue in general, to individuals.

Nor even, thus understood, does the claim that someone is a "good person."

But all the same, given what we know of the moral opinions of others and which of these might be relevant to the case at hand, telling us someone "is good," “is virtuous,” or better yet that he has some particular virtue nevertheless conveys real and useful information about what is to be expected from him.

And it perhaps as well tells us something about his moral opinions, assuming we understand those of the person making the judgment.