Mill upholds the role of impartial principle and beliefs about justice, right, and general or common good, as well as religious beliefs, and seems to underrate those of empirical egoism and interest, in political action and evaluation.
And yet he and pretty much everyone else involved at least as an onlooker in politics expects voters to generally vote their interests, though the rule is far from exceptionless.
People often vote in support of their principles, of religious agendas, or of their greed, hatred, and will to vengeance.
What were the Nazis about, after all?
Or the Muslim Brotherhood?
Or the Iranian revolution of the Ayatollahs?
Anyway, in chapter 1 Mill advances 3 conditions on the suitability of a people to a form of government, or vice versa - though it is not entirely clear that these are really three different conditions.
The people must be willing to accept it, or not so unwilling as to make establishment possible.
They must been willing and able to do what is needed to keep it standing, and omit what would undermine it.
They must be capable of fulfilling conditions of action or restraint necessary for its existence and achievement of its ends, conduciveness to which forms its recommendation.
In chapter 1 he opposes the idea that given historical, social, or economic circumstances uniquely determine the form of government.
But his notion of conditions and what they are make it clear enough he sees such things as possibly limiting the range of suitability.
Chapter 2.
He begins by saying to decide what form of government is best for a society we need a way to decide what form best serves the interests of that society.
He goes on to undermine the idea that these interests can commodiously be characterized as Order and Progress (yes, with capital letters).
But all the same he spends the entire chapter considering what conduces to either, which he thinks boils down to traits of government that encourage personal qualities conducive to either (industry, prudence, etc.) or such features of government itself as efficiency and justice.
On the whole, focusing on just these factors, he in this entire chapter completely misses whatever might actually have led to the scientific and industrial revolutions while repeating several times such numbskull claims as that whatever conduces to order also conduces to progress, provided only that there is more of it.
And yet he and pretty much everyone else involved at least as an onlooker in politics expects voters to generally vote their interests, though the rule is far from exceptionless.
People often vote in support of their principles, of religious agendas, or of their greed, hatred, and will to vengeance.
What were the Nazis about, after all?
Or the Muslim Brotherhood?
Or the Iranian revolution of the Ayatollahs?
Anyway, in chapter 1 Mill advances 3 conditions on the suitability of a people to a form of government, or vice versa - though it is not entirely clear that these are really three different conditions.
The people must be willing to accept it, or not so unwilling as to make establishment possible.
They must been willing and able to do what is needed to keep it standing, and omit what would undermine it.
They must be capable of fulfilling conditions of action or restraint necessary for its existence and achievement of its ends, conduciveness to which forms its recommendation.
In chapter 1 he opposes the idea that given historical, social, or economic circumstances uniquely determine the form of government.
But his notion of conditions and what they are make it clear enough he sees such things as possibly limiting the range of suitability.
Chapter 2.
He begins by saying to decide what form of government is best for a society we need a way to decide what form best serves the interests of that society.
He goes on to undermine the idea that these interests can commodiously be characterized as Order and Progress (yes, with capital letters).
But all the same he spends the entire chapter considering what conduces to either, which he thinks boils down to traits of government that encourage personal qualities conducive to either (industry, prudence, etc.) or such features of government itself as efficiency and justice.
On the whole, focusing on just these factors, he in this entire chapter completely misses whatever might actually have led to the scientific and industrial revolutions while repeating several times such numbskull claims as that whatever conduces to order also conduces to progress, provided only that there is more of it.
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