Of time and actuality

The A-series is not a series but a mere partition of events into past, present, and future without invocation of the B relations earlier than and later than.

But the B serious does not of itself provide for the absolute passage of time or, looked at the other way, for a moving absolute now any more than a set of possibilia of itself provides a unique actuality.

The question is whether there is a unique, absolute present much as whether there is a unique actual world.

I think the answer is affirmative, both times.

To say that every world is actual at itself means nothing or only that every world would be actual if it were actual in the not in the least world-relative sense of “actual.”

Much the same is true of time.

Each moment is present at it itself means nothing or that each is present when it is present, in the absolute, A-predicate sense.

The former position is no position and the latter a bare tautology that cannot establish what is wanted by those who wish to eliminate the absolute present or unique actuality.

Put another way, there is no B sense of “now” independent of and alternative to the A-predicate.

There is no world-relative sense of “actual” independent of and alternative to the absolute sense.

Well, so it seems to me.